Studies in the way of words

"So one might, in the end, be faced with the alternatives of either reverting to their theoretically unambitious style or giving up hope altogether of systematizing the linguistic phenomena of natural discourse. To me, neither alternative is very attractive." Paul Grice, Studies in the way of words, Prolegomena, p. 4, Harvard University Press, 1989.

I have decided to re-read Grice after I completed my reading of Davidson. I think it more & more likely that some kind of "stepping stone theory of language" - as per  my not (yet?) published thesis on common sense reasoning - might just be the sort of alternative that Grice would have found attractive.

That's of course not much more, presently, than a hunch but it's precisely things like hunches that continue to present difficulties for theories like the one of Davidson (it will be necessary for the reader to bear with me even more than usual, my sincerest apologies). A hunch is not something irrational (let alone antirational) even if it is in itself theoretically unambitious. Hunches do not commit someone to give up hope of a systematic treatment of natural reasoning, not even hope of systematic treatment of hunches.

Truth be told, hunches and intuition are suspect because they tend to be spoken by 'believers' that not just lack intellectual ambition but are proudly affirming that it's a sort of sin (mystery-murder!) to have any ambition that way. Such a point of view is, not just merely unattractive, but positively lethal (albeit temporarily cosy). An hunch is indeed a call to action but it's a call to a specific sort of action i.e. the action of an investigation into the rational merits of the hunch - any other action on hunches can only be justified by appeal to lack of time or another rational argument preventing a subject to thinking on the actual merits of what your hunch is about. This being said, I do not doubt (although I do not know for sure) whether there are no intuitions that don't admit of further rationalizing (philosophical litterature suggest there are some such), but if this were the case it would not prevent us from at least having ambition to detail which intuitions are of this kind and why this is so (contra Grice - he implies that the 2 alternatives are equally unattractive and this is not so unless he is sure a third alternative exists, which he says he is not).

Before saying anything ambitiously positive I feel compelled to add a 3d alternative (also unattractive, and this time equally unattractive than a no-intellectual-ambition one): the alternative is of overly ambitious regimentation. The traditional rationalist assumption that everything can be systematized, because everything is systematic, is also lethal (Popper said how, Quine/Davidson say why). Regimenting the facts, in some or other preconceived scheme, always leads to paradoxes (call it, on a lighter note, the Kantian hunch). Either these paradoxes are assimilated as mysteries in a scheme (and so back to lack of ambition, cfr. scientism) or they are denied (& then we have the overambitious that looks eerily similar to the overzealous but is worse: the overzealous always have a rest fraction of mystery, & therefore some openness to novelty). So, again contra Grice, the implicature there are only 3 alternatives is a real error (there are at least 4) and the topological map of the ones describes here at least supports the hunch that more theoretical ambition is not necessarily better.

So why the hell quote something and then go off on a tangent condemning it? Well I don't know; these things just happen but - as it happens - it allows me to express something I wanted to express:

Grice's hunch is, I think, correctly critical of a certain strand of thought coming from the great Witt over people like Ryle, Austin, Strawson to him: they are theoretically too unambitious. At the same time, I think, another strand of thought running over Quine & Davidson is, for all they say themselves, theoretically too ambitious. How's that possible? Is there some ideal level of ambition in between? & what would it be for there to be some sufficiently unmabitious level of ambition? I do not think we'll need to bother too long with such paradoxes; these two strands of thought - that is at least my conjecture, or hunch - deal with two qualitatively different aspects of the (still assumed indivisible) phenomenon of human thought.

Davidson's tradition is focused on standard (deductive) reasoning and - in line with the nature of logic - it is theoretically ambitious. Grice's tradition on the other hand focuses on common sense (inductive) reasoning and - in line with the tendenciy of common sense - it is theoretically unambitious. The problem for both traditions (& maybe not for Wittgenstein because he suitably split himself in two) is that they're discussing things as if there were only one aspect - as if deduction, knowledge and beliefs are things single humans do on the background & as if the fuzziness of the type of human acting we know from individuals is a fact about this world.

The former therefore tends to overregiment (even if the stated goal is not to do so) and, more specifically, assume humans have intellectual superpowers (a consistent belief system) that happen to be impaired by a lack of adequate processing powers. In the latter then again we see the theoretical lack of ambition Grice is on about. By the way, Wittgenstein in this sense doesn't have the better of anybody because the guy didn't attempt to integrate, only to delineate.

The truth then is probably  -turning the 'probably' of a hunch into something quite a bit more definite would be a worthy project indeed - and quite symbolically not in the middle. The truth, according to my present hunch, consists in systematic interactions between the purity, the extensionality and eternality of logic (with pure combinatorial productivity) and the fuzzy, intensional here-and-now-ness of our practical reasoning (with its impredictable creativity of imagination).

I think Grice - to some extent unwittingly as a contemporary of Davidson involved in an endeavour very different from theirs - launched himself into a project at the level of the 'systematic' in the (alas, too long) sentence before this. But - from the angle of his tradition - he thought it was about unfuzzying the fuzzy of the last part of the sentence. Thence the charge of 'theoretically unambitious', and the lack of mention of the theoretically overambitious .

I have to stop here: I think I have (for myself at least clarified) what programme is there to be had. I think it is an important program because it enables to find a real and systematic place for the traditional dichotomies of static & dynamic, synchronic & diachronic and pure & practical reason. The important corrolary will be in ethics where we can move on from the stalemate of relativism vs. absolutism. A nice corrolary will be that the field of common sense reasoning can finally be discussed on own merits (and relatively unknown philosophers like Kyburg saved from oblivion).

Whilst writing this I was listening to "Stimmung", KarlHeinz Stockhausen, by Paul Hillier's Theatre of Voices, published by harmonia mundi.

18:02 Gepost door Guido Nius in Algemeen | Permalink | Commentaren (0) | Tags: language, convergence, dynamics, scientism, grice |  Facebook |


knowing how/that

can you forget to know how and still know that?

intention is not as simple as action

intention requires intension requires know that!

22:46 Gepost door Guido Nius in Algemeen | Permalink | Commentaren (0) |  Facebook |


Eigenpsychisches und Fremdpsychisches

"Die eigenpsychischen Gegenstände sind erkenntnismässig primär in bezug auf die die physischen Gegenstände, die fremdpsychischen dagegen sekundär. Wir werden deshalb die physischen Gegenstände aus den eigenpsychischen und die fremdpsychischen aus den physischen konstituieren." R. Carnap, Der logische Aufbau der Welt, Felix Meiner Verlag Hamburg (1998), p. 79.

(amateuristic English translation below)

I´m on thin ice here, I know. So forgive me if I´m not going to start jumping up and down. Carnap isn´t very popular at the moment but he tried to think it true & I for one applaud him for having done just that. Maybe later I could risk going into the deep, now I merely want to wonder about the 1st person attitude (& then hurry back to safer ground).
I wonder whether Carnap doesn´t take the 1st person as too unproblematic. Let me reassure you: this is not going to be about intricate subtleties. This is about whether the 1st person here is, for instance, a giraffe - or one of those walking, talking living things known as you & me. In both 1st person cases it is necessary to constitute a world & in both cases we do well to leave all that speculative metaphysics to the side, if at all possible. But there is a difference between walking, talking living things & merely walking living things.
One such difference, & a crucial difference it is, is that the giraffe won´t write a book on 'Der logische Aufbau der Welt'. However - if it were to write one - it would have an advantage of not confusing what it knows (or thinks it knows) with what it talks about when it talks about what it (thinks it) knows. I regret having to use a hyperbole but, still, the point is clear - albeit a bit muddled (I am, in my defense not presenting an argument but just wondering).
Let us assume that something like Carnap´s assertion is correct at the base, or beastly, level. Does this then imply that it is necessarily also correct at the level of linguistically based social interaction? Carnap would have it that way as he ultimately constitutes social phenomena, even further down the road, out of the 3 areas mentioned in the quote. But the glaring weakness is that in order to do that he has to rely on thousands of years of linguistically built-up knowledge. He himself, in a quote that will certainly be treated here some time, stresses the progressive character of our human knowledge. I doubt it very much that somehow we can cut back unproblematically to those days of yore where language wasn´t yet or simply wasn´t.
Yes, that´s circumstantial evidence at best. The to-do is to answer something like the question I put higher. I do not think you can answer that question in the positive. There are no limits to the creative, productive power of language & specifically no limits set by 1st person experience or even physical objects - there is a restriction in the sense that, ultimately, linguistic creation can only make itself felt via a physical conduit (no, I may be dabbling around here but I´m definitely not dabbling around in the supernatural or esoteric) but that´s not the same.
´Nuff said for the moment. The disclaimer on 'just wondering´ was put in for public safety in good time ;-) I do think the primacy we have to respect is not that of 1st person experience but that of interpersonal communication. I also think that - whilst there is something like a giraffe 1st person in us - there is also another type of person associated to us (rather than ´in us´), and that it is, yeah why not, foolish to gloss over this type of person as if it were of 1 kind merely because we refer to it with the same word (an issue that, by the way, is addressed superbly by Carnap elsewhere in the book).

"Physical objects are cognitively based on first person psychology, other person psychology is however cognitively based on physical objects. Therefore, we will constitute physical objects out of first person psychology and the other person psychology out of physical objects." (this was the hardest one up to now - I do apologize if this is as opaque as the original is clear)

Whilst writing this I was listening to ´The Very Best of The Beach Boys'.

23:15 Gepost door Guido Nius in Algemeen | Permalink | Commentaren (0) | Tags: carnap, language, self, imagination |  Facebook |